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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No. 20030667-SC 
v. : 
Ct. of Appeals No. 20020343-CA 
LISA VICTORIA CORWELL, : 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Court granted certiorari to review the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in State 
v. Corwell, 2003 UT App 261, 74 P.3d 1171(Addendum A), which reversed the district 
court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Where a defendant is repeatedly informed of an imminent trial, scheduled for the 
next business day after she pleaded guilty, does strict compliance with rule 11(e)(3), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, require the trial court to expressly include the word "speedy" 
in establishing defendant's knowledge of "the right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury"? 
u0n certiorari, we review the court of appeals' decision for correctness, giving its 
conclusions of law no deference." State v. Casey, 2003 UT 33, f 10, 82 P.3d 1106. 
2. Where a defendant acknowledges on the record and through a properly 
incorporated plea statement that she can appeal only the denial of her motion to suppress, 
does strict compliance with rule 11 (e)(8), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure require the trial 
court to further clarify the defendant's limited right of appeal? 
This question is reviewed under the standard applied to the first issue. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTES OR RULES 
Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is appended to this petition as 
Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Liza Corwell and her codefendant, Rebecca Champneys, were charged 
with tampering with evidence, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
§ 76-8-510 (1999), unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(I) (1999), and unlawful possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5 
(1999) (R. 2-5). 
Before trial, both defendant and Ms. Champneys moved to suppress evidence obtained 
during a search of their persons and motel room (R. 49-50). Following a joint hearing, the 
trial court denied the motions (R. 47-48,66; 99:24-26). Thereafter, defendant pleaded guilty 
to attempted tampering with evidence, a third degree felony, reserving her right to appeal the 
2 
trial court's denial of her motion to suppress (R. 53, 56-62, 68; 100:2, 4, 14). The court 
sentenced defendant to a statutory term not to exceed five years in prison, but suspended the 
sentence and placed defendant on probation (R. 72-74). 
Within thirty days after the entry of judgment, defendant filed a notice of appeal and 
moved to withdraw her guilty plea (R. 75, 84; 182:2-6). Upon defendant's motion to hold 
the appeal in abeyance, the Utah Court of Appeals stayed the appeal and temporarily 
remanded the case until the trial court ruled on defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty 
plea (R. 154, 158, 160-62). The trial court denied the motion and following entry of a final 
order, defendant timely filed an amended notice of appeal (R. 164, 176; 201-02; 182:5-6). 
On appeal, defendant challenged the trial court's denial of her suppression motion and 
her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Corwell, 2003 UT App 261 at f 10.* Specifically, 
defendant claimed that in taking her guilty plea the trial court failed to strictly comply with 
rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, by failing to inform her of the right to a "speedy" 
public trial and of her "limited" right to appeal. Id. at f 11. 
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to 
withdraw her guilty plea. Id. at % 20. The court found that although defendant was informed 
that "[her] case was set for trial the following Monday . . . [ , ] the mere mention of an 
imminent trial is not sufficient to satisfy rule 1 l's requirement that a defendant be apprised 
1
 The court of appeals declined to address defendant's suppression issue, 
upholding the trial court's denial of the motion based on the law of the case doctrine, 
stemming from its resolution of the issue upon identical facts and issues in State v. 
Champneys, No. 20020123 (Utah App. March 27, 2003 (unpublished). Cornell, 2003 UT 
App 261, f l l n . l . 
3 
of the right to a speedy trial." Id. at ^ 15 (emphasis in original). The court also concluded 
that although the trial court and defendant's plea statement "informed [defendant] that she 
could appeal the denial of her motion to suppress under State v. Sery, 758 .P2d 935 (Utah 
App. 1988),...[,] the trial court's only clarification of this right.. . was never sufficiently 
explained." Id. at J^ 17. Therefore, the court concluded that the trial court had failed to 
strictly comply with the requirements of rule 11 and reversed defendant's conviction. Id. at 
f 20. Judge Thome concurred with the majority, but opined that "absent the specific failures 
. . . I believe the colloquy was exemplary and the caution demonstrated by the trial court 
should be highlighted." Id. at f 22 (Thorne, J., concurring). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
After the trial court denied defendant's suppression motion, defendant agreed to plead 
guilty to a reduced charge of attempted tampering with evidence in exchange for the right to 
preserve her appeal of the trial court's ruling and the dismissal of the remaining charges (R. 
53,56-62,68; 100:2-4, 14). 
On December 7,2001, the trial court conducted a joint change of plea hearing of both 
defendant and Ms. Champneys (Plea Hearing, R. 100:1-16, Addendum C). Ms. Champneys' 
counsel, in both defendant's and Ms. Champneys' presence, first informed the court that both 
defendants were going to plead guilty to attempted tampering with evidence under State v. 
Sery, "reserving their right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress" (R. 100:2). 
2
 Facts related to the motion to suppress issue are set out in the opinion, see 
Cornell, 2003 UT App 261, ^j 2-6, and are omitted as irrelevant to this brief. See n.l. 
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Thereafter, in both defendants' presence, the trial court began the plea colloquy by 
emphasizing that their right to appeal was being conditionally preserved through a "Sery" 
plea: "[S]o everybody is clear on that, [it] means you can appeal it" (R. 100:1, 4).3 
Defendant's counsel acknowledged the court's clarification: "That's correct" (R. 100:4). The 
court then elicited from counsel that a change of plea statement had been prepared for 
defendant, that counsel had reviewed the statement with defendant, and that counsel believed 
defendant understood the statement (R. 100:4; Statement of Defendant, R. 56-62, Addendum 
D). The statement stated: "I know that I have a right to a trial in open court by an impartial 
jury, and that I am giving up that right by pleading guilty." The statement omitted the word 
"speedy" from defendant's trial right (R. 58). 
Addressing both defendant and Ms. Champneys, the court indicated that it would ask 
each of them questions (R. 100:4). Thereafter, the court conducted a plea colloquy of both 
defendants, alternating its questions to each defendant and receiving each defendant's answer 
in turn (R. 100:4-15). The court first emphasized that it needed to be sure that defendant had 
plenty of time to discuss the content of the plea statement with her attorney because she 
would be surrendering rights in pleading guilty (R. 100:5). Defendant assured the court that 
she had had plenty of time to review the statement with her attorney and that she believed she 
understood the statement (R. 100:5). In response to the court's specific questions, defendant 
acknowledged her understanding of her rights: 
• pleading guilty to a third degree felony potentially subjected her to a 
3
 See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). 
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maximum five-year sentence in the Utah State Prison and a fine as high 
as $5,000 (R. 100:5-6); 
• the court had not yet made up its mind on defendant's sentence and would 
decide the sentence only after reading the presentence report and hearing 
what all counsel and she had to say (R. 100:6-7); 
• in giving up the right to a trial, scheduled for the following Monday, she 
was giving up important constitutional and statutory rights outlined in 
her statement (R. 100:7); 
• by pleading guilty, there would be no trial the following Monday (R. 100:7); 
• she wanted to give up her right to a trial the following Monday (R. 100:7); 
• if there was a trial she would have the right, though she would not be 
required, to testify and tell her story to a jury and that by not having a 
trial she would not be able to testify (R. 100:7-8); 
• by pleading guilty she would give up her right to confront her accusers, 
witnesses that the State would call to prove her guilt of the charged 
offense (R. 100:8); 
• by pleading guilty she would prevent her attorney from cross examining 
the State's witnesses to test their credibility (R. 100:8); 
• the court presumed she was innocent and would require a 
jury, if the case were tried, to presume similarly until and unless the 
State proved her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 100:8-9); 
• by pleading guilty she lost her right to the presumption of innocence 
and that she wanted to give up that right (R. 100:9); 
• by pleading guilty she gave up the opportunity to defend herself and 
to require the State to meet the high standard of proving her guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 100:9-10); 
• she was pleading guilty to attempted tampering with evidence, a third 
degree felony, which she and Champneys had committed on March 13, 
2001, by attempting to alter, destroy or conceal evidence, believing 
that an official investigation was going on (R. 100:10); 
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• on March 13, 2001, at 1990 West North Temple Street, she and 
Champneys, after seeing police officers and communicating with 
them verbally, attempted to conceal materials (R. 100:10); 
• she believed she was guilty of the offense she was pleading guilty to 
(R. 100:11). 
Although the court informed defendant that by pleading she was giving up her right 
to the trial before an impartial jury, scheduled for the following Monday, the trial court 
neglected to include the word "speedy" in its colloquy (R. 100:7-9). 
The court then confirmed that defendant had not consumed alcoholic beverages in the 
past twenty-four hours, was not under the influence of any drugs, and was thinking clearly 
(R. 100:11). The court also elicited from defendant that nothing in the court's discussion was 
unclear and that she had no questions before she tendered her guilty plea (R. 100:12). The 
trial court asked defense counsel, "[A]nything else either one of you would have me ask your 
client regarding Rule 11 appointments?" (R. 100:12). Counsel for Champneys said, "No" 
(R. 100:12). Counsel for defendant said, "I have nothing, Your Honor" (R. 100:12). 
Following Champneys' plea-taking, the court accepted defendant's guilty plea to attempted 
tampering with evidence, signed defendant's statement, and observed that their appeared to 
be a factual basis for the plea (R. 100:13-14). The court then expressed its belief that 
defendant understood the rights she was surrendering and the attendant consequences and 
that defendant had entered her plea voluntarily (R. 100:14-15). Before concluding the 
proceedings, the trial court informed defendant that she had the right to be sentenced in not 
less than two days but not more than forty-five days (R. 100:15). 
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The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate five-year term in the Utah 
State Prison, but suspended the sentence and placed defendant on probation (R. 72-74). 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 75). Defendant thereafter filed a timely motion 
to withdraw her guilty plea, challenging the plea-taking on multiple grounds, including the 
trial court's failure to inform her of her right to a uspeedy" trial and of the limitations on her 
right to appeal (R. 84, 120-23; 182:2-6). 
At the hearing on defendant's motion, defense counsel acknowledged that he had 
looked at the plea statement and that defendant had said she read and understood it (R. 182:1-
3). However, counsel asserted that defendant's motion was based on the trial court's failure 
to expressly mention four rule 11 rights during the plea colloquy (R. 182:4). Although 
counsel acknowledged that the colloquy could be properly supplemented by reference to 
defendant's plea statement, he asserted that the statement failed to mention the right to 
speedy trial (R. 182:4). The trial court observed that the plea was taken on a Friday and that 
defendant had been informed that the trial was set for the following Monday, commenting, 
w6Can't get much speedier than that" (R. 182:4-5). Defense counsel agreed with the court's 
comment and acknowledged that the court had informed defendant of the imminent trial 
setting (R. 182:5). The court then found that defendant's rule 11 rights had been properly 
explained to her through the oral colloquy in conjunction with defendant's statement (R. 
182:5). The court also found that its omission during the colloquy of any rights referenced 
by defendant was harmless (R. 182:5). The court denied defendant's motion, concluding that 
defendant's plea was made "knowingly and voluntarily" (R. 177-78 at 178; 182:5). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The court of appeals incorrectly determined that because the trial court omitted the 
word "speedy" in reciting the trial rights that defendant was surrendering in pleading guilty, 
the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11(e). Under State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, 
a trial court strictly complies with rule 11 where the circumstances of the plea-taking 
effectively inform the defendant of rule 11 rights. In this case, defendant was fully aware 
that her trial was scheduled for the next business day. By requiring a rote recitation of rule 
11 rights in the circumstances of this case, the court of appeals has elevated form over 
substance in plea-taking in contravention of this Court's governing authority. 
POINT II 
The court of appeals incorrectly determined that the trial court failed to adequately 
inform defendant of her limited right of appeal under rule 11(e)(8). Contrary to the court of 
appeals' understanding, the rule requires the trial court only to explain the extent to which 
the right of appeal is preserved when a defendant conditionally pleads. In this case, it is 
undisputed that defendant was aware that by conditionally pleading guilty she was 
surrendering the right to appeal any aspect of her conviction other than the trial court's denial 




THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS IMPROPERLY INTERPRETED 
STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 11(e) TO REQUIRE ROTE 
RECITATION OF "THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL BEFORE AN 
IMPARTIAL JURY" WITHOUT REGARD TO THE SUBSTANTIVE 
CONTENT OF THE COURT'S INQUIRY OR THE JUNCTURE OF 
THE PROCEEDINGS AT WHICH THE COLLOQUY OCCURRED 
The court of appeals held that the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11(e), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, by omitting the word "speedy" from the trial rights 
defendant was surrendering in entering a conditional guilty plea, even though defendant 
unmistakably understood her speedy trial right through notice that her trial was scheduled for 
the following business day. Corwell, 2003 UT App 261, f^ f 15-16, 20. By interpreting the 
rule to require the rote recitation of rule 11 rights, the court of appeals has undermined this 
Court's policy-based interpretation of rule 11(e) law, which focuses instead on a defendant's 
comprehensive, practical understanding of the plea. See, e.g., State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, 
11 11, 22 P.3d 1242; State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 1991). 
"On certiorari, we review the court of appeals' decision for correctness, giving its 
conclusions of law no deference." State v. Casey, 2003 UT 33,110, 82 P.3d 1106. 
This Court has placed responsibility for establishing strict compliance with all 
constitutional and rule 11(e) requirements squarely on the trial court. Visser, 2000 UT 88 at 
1f 11 (citing State v. Gibbons, 7'40 P.2d at 1309, 1311, 1313 (Utah 1987)). Prior to accepting 
a guilty plea, the trial court must make all the inquiries necessary to determine on the record 
that the defendant "has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its 
10 
consequences" and is thus entering it voluntarily. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,243-44 
(1969). 
To ensure that the defendant fully understands the nature of her act, the court may 
employ a variety of methods. Strict compliance "can be accomplished by multiple means. 
.. as long as no requirement of the rule is omitted and so long as the record reflects that the 
requirement has been fulfilled." Visser, 2000 UT 88 atf 12. The methodology for ensuring 
compliance with rule 11 is thus not based on the trial court's talismanic recitation of an 
enumerated list of rights. There is no rote script that every trial court must follow to fulfill 
the letter of the law. Id. at f^ 11 (concluding experience of trial during which the defendant 
chose to enter guilty plea "communicated at least as much as would the mere oral recitation 
of the 'right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury'"). Consequently, although strict 
compliance is ultimately a matter of law, it will turn on the facts of each case. Maguire, 830 
P.2d at 217 (citing State v. Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119, 1125 (Utah 1991)). 
In State v. Visser, the Utah Supreme Court rejected a claim that the trial court failed 
to strictly comply with rule 11(e) when it omitted the term "speedy" in informing the 
defendant of his right to a speedy public trial. State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, ffl[13,17,22 P.3d 
1242. Visser pleaded guilty mid-trial, and one day after trial moved to withdraw his guilty 
plea. Id. at Tjf 3-6. In rejecting the rule 11 claim, the court recited subdivision 11(e)(8), 
recognizing that "the rule is stated permissively and thus does not prevent a court from taking 
into account other record factors in making its finding." Id. at Tfl2.4 The court concluded 
4
 Subdivision 11(e)(8) provides: "[The findings mandated by rule 11] may be 
based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a sworn statement reciting 
11 
that because Visser was in the middle of a trial and understood from the trial court that he 
had a right to continue with trial at the time he pleaded guilty, any "recitation, either orally 
or by affidavit, that [he] had the 'right to a speedy trial,' would have communicated no more 
than his actual trial experience to that point." Id. at f^ 14. 
Purporting to distinguishing this case from Visser, the court of appeals first observed 
that because defendant's plea was taken pre-trial, rather than mid-trial as in Visser, 
defendant's right to a speedy trial was insufficiently communicated to her. Corwell, 2003 
UT App 261 at^ f 15. The court acknowledged that "the trial court did note that [defendant's] 
case was set for trial the following Monday." Id. However, the court concluded that because 
trials are frequently subject to delays and continuances, "the mere mention of an imminent 
trial is not sufficient to satisfy rule 11 's requirement that a defendant be apprised of the right 
to a speedy trial." Id. (emphasis in original). 
In this case, the trial court did not simply "note" or "merely mention" that defendant's 
trial was set for the following Monday. It repeatedly called defendant's attention to the 
imminence of her trial during the colloquy. At the beginning of the plea-taking, in 
defendant's and her counsel's presence, the trial court stated that the case was set for trial the 
following Monday (R. 100:1-2). Thereafter, the court elicited from defendant that she 
understood that she would be waiving important constitutional and statutory rights "if you 
give up your right to have a trial which is scheduled next Monday" (R. 100:7). Immediately 
afterward, the court emphasized that it wanted to make sure defendant was clear that "if you 
these factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and 
acknowledged the contents of the sworn statement." 
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plead guilty, there's no trial next Monday. Do you understand that?" (R. 100:7). Defendant 
answered affirmatively (R. 100:7). On this record, defendant could not have failed to 
understand that she had a right to a speedy trial. 
In distinguishing between an "imminent" trial and a "speedy" trial, the court of 
appeals elevates form over substance and violates the very policy established in Visser and 
Maguire which it purports to uphold: the practical circumstances of the plea-taking, rather 
than a rote recitation of rights, establish whether the defendant has been sufficiently informed 
of rule 11 rights before pleading. See Visser, 2000 UT 88 at ^  11. Every criminal defendant 
has a speedy trial right. U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Utah Const, art. I, § 12; Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-1 -6 (1 )(f). However, this Court has repeatedly held that a criminal defendant's right to 
a speedy trial is not compromised merely because the proceedings may be delayed or 
continued. State v. Trqfhy, 799 P.2d 704, 706-09 (Utah 1990) (no violation of speedy trial 
right under state or federal constitutions where delays not attributable to State and were 
occasioned by the defendant); State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, 142-43 (Utah 1989) (same); 
State v. Menzies, 601 P.2d 925, 926 (Utah 1979) (no violation of statutory speedy trial right 
where delays attributable to the defendant). 
Moreover, contrary to the court of appeals' assertion, see Corwell, 2003 UT App 261, 
Tj 15, defendant's understanding of her right to a speedy trial is supported by Visser. In 
Visser, this Court held that Visser's direct experience of trial, coupled with the trial court's 
explanation that Visser could pursue his trial and the absence of any allegation that the 
proceedings to that point were not timely, were circumstances that sufficiently communicated 
13 
the right to a speedy trial. Visser, 1245-46. The circumstances of this case equally 
communicated the speedy trial right: defendant was repeatedly informed that her trial was 
imminent, nothing in the record hints that the proceedings to that point had been delayed or 
that trial would be continued, and defendant was repeatedly informed and agreed that by 
pleading guilty she was giving up the right to a trial the following Monday (R. 100:7-9). 
Whatever practical understanding or temporal limit may apply to "speedy," an "imminent" 
trial set for the following business day must be included within that term. See Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary (1993) ("imminent": "ready to take place; near at hand"); 
Webster's New World Dictionary (1956) ("imminent": "likely to happen without delay; 
impending"). 
The court of appeals also relies on uncertain authority in asserting that the 
circumstances would not have informed defendant of her right to a distinctively "speedy" 
trial, as opposed to a "lengthy and delayed" trial. Corwell 2003 UT App 261 at f 16 (citing 
State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134,47 P.3d 101, tmdState v. Dean, 2002 UT App 323, 57 P.3d 
1106). In both Hittle and Dean, the court of appeals found plain error in a colloquy and plea 
statement that omitted the word "speedy" in informing the defendant of his trial rights. 
Hittle, 2002 UT App 134 at ffl[ 6-11; Dean, 2002 UT App 323, ffl[ 10-13. Both Hittle and 
Dean are on certiorari review to this Court upon the question of whether the omission the 
single word, "speedy," from the plea colloquy constitutes obvious prejudicial error. See 
State's Pet. Cert, at 1 in State v. Hittle, No. 20020504-SC; State's Pet. Cert, at 1-2 in State 
v. Dean, No. 20020952-SC. 
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The court of appeals' reliance on Dean is further undermined by its attempt in that 
case to distinguish this Court's decision in State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, 26 P.3d 203. 
Dean, 2002 UT App 323, f 11. In Martinez, the defendant claimed, among other things, that 
he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter a guilty plea because the trial court did not 
establish that he understood the elements of the crime, even though he repeatedly 
acknowledged his understanding of those elements and the supporting facts. Id. at ff 21,23-
24. Although the apparent omission of the word "speedy" from the statement of trial rights 
was not directly at issue, this Court held that the trial court's recitation of rule 11 rights, 
including the "right to a jury trial and that the matter was set for trial," constituted strict 
compliance and supported the conclusion that the guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily 
entered. Id. at fflf 4, 23-26. 
This case is at least as compelling as Martinez. Defendant repeated assured the trial 
court that she had reviewed and understood her plea statement, which stated: "I know that 
I have a right to a trial in open court by an impartial jury, and that I am giving up that right 
by pleading guilty" (R. 100:4-5; R. 58). The trial court repeatedly stated that defendant's trial 
was set for the following Monday and that by pleading guilty defendant would be 
surrendering her right to that trial (R. 100:7-9). Defendant acknowledged that nothing in the 
court's discussion was unclear and that she had no questions before she tendered her guilty 
plea (R. 100:12). At the hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw her guilty plea, defense 
counsel acknowledged that defendant had said she read and understood the plea statement 
(R. 182:1-3). On this record, defendant cannot credibly assert that she was not aware of the 
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immediacy of her trial or that her plea was not knowing or voluntary. 
In sum, by focusing on form rather than substance, the court of appeals insisted that 
the trial court include the term "speedy" in its rule 11 colloquy, even though the essence of 
the speedy trial right was emphatically communicated by repeated notice that the trial was 
imminent. Consequently, the court of appeals incorrectly concluded that the trial court failed 
to strictly comply with rule 11. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION, THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
FAILED TO EXPLAIN DEFENDANT'S LIMITED RIGHT OF APPEAL 
UNDER RULE 11, MISAPPREHENDS THE RULE AND CONFUSES 
THE LEGAL ADEQUACY OF THE CONDITIONAL PLEA 
The court of appeals concluded that the trial court failed to sufficiently clarify for 
defendant that her "right of appeal is limited," as required by rule 11(e)(8). Corwell, 2003 
UT App 261, ^ f 17. However, the colloquy at the plea hearing, coupled with defendant's 
correctly incorporated plea statement, make clear that defendant understood that her right of 
appeal was limited. 
Rule 11 (e)(8) states: "The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty . . . , and may 
not accept the plea until the court has found . . . the defendant has been advised that the right 
of appeal is limited." Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (e)(8). 
The court of appeals' entire analysis of the trial court's purported failure to adequately 
inform defendant of her rights under rule 11 (e)(l 1) is set out in a single paragraph: 
The trial judge also failed to inform Corwell that her guilty plea limited 
her right to appeal. "By pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to have 
admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged and thereby waives 
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all non-jurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional 
violations." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989). The trial 
judge and the plea statement merely informed Corwell that she could appeal 
the denial of her motion to suppress under State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah 
Ct. App.1988). However, the trial court's only clarification of this right was, 
"so everybody is clear on that, it means you can appeal it." "It" was never 
sufficiently explained. Likewise, it was defense counsel that acknowledged 
the court's "clarification." Just as a jury trial is a separate and distinct right 
from the right to a speedy public trial, the limits on an appeal are separate from 
the right to appeal generally. See Hittle, 2002 UT App 134 at % 8,47 P.3d 101. 
Corwell, 2003 UT App 261, H 17. 
Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals appears to conclude that the trial court's 
error lay in failing to apprise defendant that "by pleading guilty, [she] is deemed to have 
admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged and thereby waives all 
non-jurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations." Id. That 
statement, however, unlike all other plainly stated rule 11 (e) rights, is not explicitly required 
by rule 11 (e)(8). That statement is a rather technical explication of the simple fact that by 
pleading guilty a criminal defendant waives the right to appeal any aspect of the conviction 
and sentence. Defendant's plea statement states that if she was tried by a judge or jury she 
would have the right to appeal her conviction, but that by pleading guilty she understood that 
she was giving up that right (Plea Statement, R. 56-62 at 59). The plea statement, as well as 
the trial court's colloquy, plainly state that defendant's plea reserved her right to appeal the 
denial of the suppression motion under State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) (R. 56; 
100:2-4). On direct appeal, it was undisputed that the trial court adequately incorporated the 
plea statement into the colloquy by eliciting from defendant that she had had plenty of time 
17 
to review the statement with her attorney and that she believed she understood the statement 
R. (100:5). 
In sum, the record of the plea-taking amply shows that defendant was fully apprised 
of her limited right of appeal, to wit: by pleading guilty under Sery, she surrendered her right 
to appeal any aspect of her conviction except the denial of her motion to suppress. In Visser, 
this Court stated rule 11's the basic policy objective: 
We thus reemphasize that the substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure that 
defendants know of their rights and thereby understand the basic consequences 
of their decision to plead guilty. That goal should not be overshadowed or 
undermined by formalistic ritual. 
Visser, 2000 UT 88 at f 11.5 By requiring a technical explanation of the limited right of 
appeal, the court of appeals went beyond this Court's directive in Visser. 
Additionally, the court of appeals factually determined that the trial court failed to 
sufficiently clarify for defendant that her right of appeal was limited to her right to appeal the 
denial of the motion to suppress. Specifically, the court notes that "the trial court's only 
clarification of this right was, 'so everybody is clear on that, it means you can appeal it,'" but 
that "it" was never sufficiently explained. Corwell, 2003 UT App 261, ^ 17. This finding 
5
 In fact, it is apparent from the history of rule 11 that subsection (e)(8) was 
enacted to require the trial court to explain only that any appeal was limited to an 
expressly reserved issue. When Gibbons issued in 1987, subdivision 11(e)(8) did not 
exist. See Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312; Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (1993) amendment note. In 
1993, subdivisions (e)(8) and (i), the latter providing for conditional pleas, were added to 
rule 11. Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (1993) amendment note. Thus, it appears clear that 
subdivision 1 l(e)(8)'s "limited right of appeal" contemplates only the circumstance in 
which a defendant pleads conditionally guilty and that the requirement to advise 
defendant of his limited right of appeal goes only to assuring that defendant knows that by 
pleading the right to appeal a specific issue is reserved. 
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is inexplicable considering the court of appeals' recognition that "[t]he trial judge and the 
plea statement merely informed Corwell that she could appeal the denial of her motion to 
suppress understate v. Sery" Moreover, the record fully supports that defendant must have 
understood that "if referred to her right to appeal the denial of her suppression motion. 
Defense counsel for Champneys indicated that both Champneys and defendant were going 
to plead guilty "under State v. Sery, reserving their right to appeal the denial of the motion 
to suppress" (R. 100:2). Barely more than a page of transcript later, defendant's counsel said, 
"And again Your Honor, the State agreed (inaudible) State v. Sery" (R. 100:4). The trial 
court immediately responded, "Which, so that everybody is clear on that, means you can 
appeal it" (R. 100:4). Given the proximity of the earlier express announcement that 
defendant was reserving her right to appeal the denial of her suppression motion to the trial 
court's acknowledgment that defendant could appeal "it," defendant's acknowledgment that 
she was "thinking clearly," and her obvious engagement in the entire plea-taking from start 
to finish, the court of appeals' finding that the trial court failed to sufficiently clarify that 
defendant knew she was reserving her right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion 
is untenable. Indeed, defendant's appeal of the denial of her motion to suppress evinces her 
understanding of the limited right of appeal as articulated by the trial court. 
Significantly, the court of appeals' factual finding goes beyond any alleged factual 
error ever asserted by defendant. Defendant, in the trial court and on direct appeal, claimed 
that the trial court had failed to explain under rule 11 (e)(8) that by pleading guilty defendant 
was surrendering the right to attack nonjurisdictional defects (R. 120-23, 182:2-6; Aplt. Br. 
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at 24-25). However, defendant never claimed that the trial court had failed to sufficiently 
inform her that her plea reserved her right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion. 
Both in her opening and reply briefs, defendant conceded that the trial court informed her 
that her plea expressly reserved her right to appeal the denial of the suppression motion. 
Aplt. Br. at 25; Reply at 8. Thus, the court of appeals has engaged in fact-finding to save a 
concession already made by defendant. Utah's appellate courts have consistently declined 
to reverse on a point of law or fact conceded by a party. See State v. Pearson, 680 P.2d 406, 
407 (Utah 1984); State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 710-11 (Utah App. 1993). 
In sum, the court of appeals incorrectly concluded that the trial court had failed to 
inform defendant of her limited right of appeal under rule 11(e)(8). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons articulated, the State asks this Court to reverse the court of appeals' 
determination that the trial court did not strictly comply with rule 11(e). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j±_ day of February, 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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JACKSON, Presiding Judge: 
Hi Liza Corwell appeals from the trial court's denial of her 
motion to withdraw her guilty plea from a conviction for 
attempted tampering with evidence in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated §§ 76-8-510 and 76-4-101 (1999). We reverse and 
remand. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 On March 13, 2001, Detectives Troy Anderson and Tracy Ita of 
the Salt Lake City Police Department investigated a report that 
Corwell and Rebecca Champneys might be "using and/or selling 
narcotics" at a motel. The informant specifically directed the 
detectives to room number 236 at the Motel 6, located at 1990 
West North Temple Street in Salt Lake City. 
H3 Based on this information, the detectives went to the motel 
room and knocked on the door. Detective Ita identified himself 
as "Tracy" and, after Champneys expressed some confusion, Ita 
responded that he was "Tracy with the Salt Lake City Police 
Department." Then both officers displayed their badges--Ita 
through the peep hole in the door and Anderson through an 
adjoining window. Anderson testified that there was a "six to 
twelve" inch gap between the curtain and the door through which 
he could see into the room. When the detectives asked if Corwell 
was also in the room, Champneys initially responded negatively. 
She later admitted that Corwell was in the room, however, after 
Anderson observed another woman in the room. 
1f4 After the detectives displayed their badges and asked 
Champneys to open the door, Champneys attempted to close the gap 
in the curtains. At the same time, Anderson saw Corwell put what 
he thought was a crack pipe into a purse and put it behind the 
bed. Anderson then observed "a lot of movement in the room," 
including trips to the bathroom by both women and efforts to 
conceal objects under the bed. 
15 The detectives repeatedly asked Champneys to open the door. 
When she refused, Ita obtained a key from the motel manager. 
Even with the key, however, the detectives were unable to enter 
the room because the women had dead-bolted the door. Detective 
Ita then kicked the door open. 
f6 Once inside the room, Anderson arrested Champneys and 
Corwell. A search of Champneys turned up a metallic pipe, which 
she admitted she used to smoke cocaine. He also discovered 
cocaine, Kleenex, and a burnt Brillo pad. A search of Corwell 
revealed a rock of cocaine and drug paraphernalia. While being 
searched in the bathroom, Champneys grabbed some cocaine from the 
counter and tried to flush it down the drain. 
f7 On September 19, 2001, the trial court denied Corwell's 
motion to suppress. On December 7, 2001, Corwell entered a 
conditional guilty plea to attempted tampering with evidence, 
reserving her right to appeal the trial court's ruling on the 
suppression motion. Though both the plea statement and the trial 
court's questioning omitted the word "speedy" from the discussion 
of Corwellfs rights, the trial court did inform Corwell that by 
pleading guilty she was giving up her right to a trial before an 
impartial jury, and that her trial was scheduled for the 
following Monday. 
18 On April 2, 2002, judgment was entered. On April 26, 2002, 
Corwell filed a notice of appeal. However, on April 29, Corwell 
moved to withdraw her guilty plea. On June 5, 2002, Corwell 
filed a motion and memorandum "to hold appeal in abeyance and to 
stay the briefing schedule pending disposition of motion to 
withdraw guilty plea." In her motion, Corwell stated that if the 
trial court denied her motion to withdraw her guilty plea, she 
planned to appeal the denial of the motion to this court and 
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would then request that this court consolidate her appeals from 
her conviction and the denial of her motion. 
f9 On June 20, this court stayed the appeal and temporarily 
remanded the case, directing the trial court to rule on Corwell•s 
motion to withdraw her guilty plea. In granting the stay, this 
court stated: "If the trial court denies the motion, Appellant 
shall file an amended notice of appeal under the same appellate 
case number." On June 21, the trial court denied the motion. On 
September 10, Corwell filed a supplemental designation of record, 
a supplemental certificate, and a supplemental request for 
transcript. The final order was not entered until October 11, 
2002. On October 28, 2002, Corwell filed an amended notice of 
appeal of the trial court's denial of her motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
flO Corwell challenges the trial court's denial of her motion to 
withdraw her guilty plea. Specifically, Corwell challenges the 
trial court's compliance with rule 11 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure in taking her guilty plea. Whether the trial 
court strictly complied with rule 11 is a question of law, which 
we review for correctness. See State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 
60,110, 983 P.2d 556 ("the . . . question of whether the trial 
court strictly complied with constitutional and procedural 
requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that 
is reviewed for correctness" (quoting State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 
430, 433 (Utah 1996))) . 
ANALYSIS 
f11 Corwell challenges the trial court's denial of her motion to 
withdraw her guilty plea, arguing that the trial court failed to 
strictly comply with rule 11fs requirements that she be informed 
of her right to a speedy trial and that her guilty plea would 
limit her right to appeal.1 
1. Corwell also argues that the police did not have probable 
cause to search her hotel room. This exact issue was previously 
addressed by this court in an appeal filed by Corwell's co-
defendant. See State v. Champneys, Case No. 20020123 (Utah Ct. 
App. March 27, 2003) . Under the terms of State v. Ellis, 969 
P.2d 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), the law of the case doctrine 
renders Champnevs binding on us for the purposes of Corwell's 
appeal. Accordingly, we decline to address the issue. 
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f12 It is well established that rule 11*s requirements must be 
strictly complied with by trial courts. Rule 11(e) "squarely 
places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional 
and rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea 
is entered." State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1937). 
This duty requires "strict compliance" with the rule, State v. 
Abevta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993), which means "'"that the 
trial court [must] . . . establish on the record that the 
defendant knowingly waived his or her constitutional rights [to 
a] speedy public trial before an impartial jury."'" State v. 
Dean, 2002 UT App 323,110 n.2, 57 P.3d 1106 (quoting State v. 
Visser, 2000 UT 88,ff10-11, 22 P.3d 1242 (quoting Utah R. Crim. 
P. 11(e))). 
113 In Visser, however, the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
strict compliance rule does not "mandate a particular script or 
rote recitation of the rights listed." Visser, 2000 UT 88 at 
111. Instead, the rule requires that the trial court ensure that 
defendants know their rights and the consequences for waiving 
them by pleading guilty. See id. While the trial court must 
therefore make certain that "no requirement of the rule is 
omitted," id. at 1l2, the court is allowed to rely on the 
circumstances of the case to determine whether the defendant has 
been appraised of his or her rights. See id. 
114 The facts of Visser are instructive. In Visser, the 
defendant entered a guilty plea in the middle of his trial. See 
id. at fl. He later filed a motion to withdraw his plea, arguing 
that the trial court had failed to inform him of his 
constitutional right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury. 
See id. The trial court denied the motion. See id. at 16. On 
review, the supreme court concluded that "'strict compliance can 
be accomplished by multiple means.'" Id. at 1l2 (quoting State 
v. Maauire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 1991)). Thus, where "'the 
contents of other documents such as the information, presentence 
reports, exhibits, etc.,1" indicate that "'no requirement of the 
rule [has been) omitted,1" the court's ruling will be deemed to 
have been in compliance with rule 11. Visser, 2000 UT 88 at 1l2 
(citations omitted). Accordingly, insofar as "the record 
detail[ed] Visser's personal trial experience up to the point of 
his plea agreement," the supreme court therefore "conclude[d] 
that this experience communicated at least as much as would the 
mere oral recitation of the 'right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury.'" Id. at fl3. 
115 The present case presents a scenario significantly different 
from that presented in Visser. Whereas Visser's mid-trial status 
evidenced a clear understanding of his right to a speedy trial, 
Corwell's trial had not yet started at the time of her plea. 
Thus, she was never afforded the right to a speedy trial, and no 
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such right was communicated to her in the colloquy. It is true 
that the trial court did note that Corwell's case was set for 
trial the following Monday. We conclude, however, that this 
mention did not effectively communicate to Corwell that she had a 
right to a speedy trial. Modern trial practice is replete with 
opportunities for delay, postponement, or continuance. Without 
more, the mere mention of an imminent trial date is not 
sufficient to satisfy rule 11fs requirement that a defendant be 
apprised of the right to a speedy trial. 
fl6 This conclusion is supported by our prior case law. In 
State v. Hittle, we concluded that omitting the word "speedy" 
constituted plain error because "the constitutional right to a 
speedy trial is a distinct right of criminal defendants, separate 
from the right to a trial before an impartial jury." 2002 UT App 
134,18, 47 P.3d 101. "If the defendant is not fully informed of" 
his [or her] rights prior to pleading guilty, then the guilty 
plea cannot be voluntary." Id. at flO. Although the term 
"speedy" "may be communicated by various means to the defendant, 
[it] may not be considered [a] merely inconsequential modifier[] 
to the jury trial right." Dean, 2002 UT App 323 at flO n.2. 
Here, nothing in the record suggests that the trial court 
established that Corwell waived anything more than her right to a 
lengthy and delayed trial. 
fl7 The trial judge also failed to inform Corwell that her 
guilty plea limited her right to appeal. "By pleading guilty, 
the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential 
elements of the crime charged and thereby waives all non-
jurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional 
violations." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989). 
The trial judge and the plea statement merely informed Corwell 
that she could appeal the denial of her motion to suppress under 
State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). However, the 
trial court's only clarification of this right was, "so everybody 
is clear on that, it means you can appeal it." "It" was never 
sufficiently explained. Likewise, it was defense counsel that 
acknowledged the court's "clarification." Just as a jury trial 
is a separate and distinct right from the right to a speedy 
public trial, the limits on an appeal are separate from the right 
to appeal generally. See Hittle, 2002 UT App 123 at f8. 
fl8 The State contends that by failing to include the right to a 
speedy trial and the provision concerning the limited right to 
appeal in the plea statement, and by failing to point out the 
omissions when the trial judge asked "if there was anything 
either one of you would have me ask your client regarding Rule 11 
appointments," Corwell invited error. We disagree. "[I]t is not 
sufficient to assume that defense attorneys make sure that their 
clients fully understand the contents of the affidavit." 
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Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313. The duty to ensure that defendants 
know and understand the rights they are surrendering when 
pleading guilty rests not on the parties, but on the trial court. 
See id. at 1312. 
fl9 The State also claims that the trial court strictly complied 
with the rule 11 requirements insofar as Corwell was aware of the 
rights that were overlooked, and that the guilty plea was 
properly accepted. In his order denying Corwell's motion to 
withdraw her guilty plea, the trial judge conceded that he 
covered "most" of the rule 11 requirements and thus 
"substantially" complied with rule 11(e). However, case law 
requires "strict compliance with rule 11, rather than substantial 
compliance" when accepting a guilty plea. See id. at 1313-14; 
see also Visser, 2000 UT 88 at fll; Abeyta, 852 P.2d at 995; 
State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186,Hl2, 5 P.3d 1222. The 
quantum of error is irrelevant; rather, strict compliance 
requires reversal in this case because the trial court failed to 
inform Corwell of two of her constitutionally protected rights. 
See Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App 186 at fl9. Accordingly, the trial 
court did not strictly comply with rule 11(e), and it erred in 
denying Corwell's timely motion to withdraw her guilty plea. 
CONCLUSION 
U20 The trial court erred in denying Corwell's motion to 
withdraw her guilty plea because the trial court did not strictly 
comply with rule 11(e) during the plea colloquy. Accordingly, we 
reverse the denial of Corwell's motion to withdraw her plea, 
vacate her conviction, and remand for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
Norman H. Jackson, 
Presiding Judge 
121 I CONCUR: 
t&****L-i? 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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THORNE, Judge, (concurring): 
f22 I concur with the decision to reverse the trial court's 
denial of Corwell's motion to withdraw her plea based on the 
trial court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, absent the specific 
failures outlined in the majority opinion, I believe the plea 
colloquy was exemplary and the caution demonstrated by the trial 
court should be highlighted. During the colloquy, the trial 
court conducted an in-depth discussion with Corwell addressing 
virtually all of the rights due her in the criminal proceeding. 
The discussion ranged from the court's ensuring that Corwell had 
read and understood the pleading document prepared by counsel, 
to its explaining that, in pleading guilty, she was waiving her 
right to a jury trial, her right to confront the State's 
witnesses, the presumption of innocence, and the State's duty to 
prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also 
explained to Corwell the range of possible sentences she faced 
should she accept the plea agreement. 
123 Furthermore, it is clear from the record that the trial 
court understood that rule 11 does not envision nor require the 
recitation of a formulaic speech. Rather, the trial court 
understood that, under rule 11, its role was to conduct an actual 
inquiry into the nature and depth of the defendant's 
understanding of her rights and to ensure that her plea was 
entered in a knowing and voluntary fashion. 
f24 Finally, because the court accepted the plea pursuant to 
State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and 
because the trial was scheduled to begin on the day following the 
plea hearing, the court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11 
is understandable, albeit insufficient to satisfy our rule 11 
jurisprudence. 
f25 Accordingly, I concur with the decision to reverse and 
remand the trial court's denial of Corwell's motion to withdraw 
her guilty plea. 
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ADDENDUM B 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
'a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be 
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a 
reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty no contest, not guilty by reason 
of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative 
not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or 
if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not 
guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an 
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or 
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly 
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the 
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial 
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court 
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived; 
(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant 
or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that 
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record 
or, if used, a sworn statement reciting these factors after the court has 
established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the 
contents of the sworn statement. If the defendant cannot understand the 
English language, it will be sufficient that the sworn statement has been read 
or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to 
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included 
offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved by 
the court. 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall 
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not 
binding on the court. 
'hn 1. The judge shall not participate in plea discussions pnor to any olea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney P 
rJ.ulJ!l??ka t e n t a t , v e P,ea a^wment has been reached, the judge, upon 
X k ! h e Pa/t,eS* m a y p e m i t t h e dlscl°sure of the tentative agWemen" 
and the reasons for ,t, in advance of the time for tender of the plea The judge £ 0 ™ ^ ^ ? t 0 the, P"secutin« a t t o r n e v a"d defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in confer-
mi y with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and ?hen 
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea 
ri, With approval of the court and the consent of the' prosecution a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally il or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on apjSS from th^ judgment
 o a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial moton A 
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea 
• ^ *u " a d ? f e n d a n t ternder9 a ? l ea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
^^^i^r^s:defendant is menta,y ,u in accordance 
btrnin200iefeCtiVe M a y l' 1 9 9 3 ; J a n u a r y l' 1 9 9 6 ; Nove»ber 1. 1997; Novem-
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1 SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH; DECEMBER 7, 2001 
2 HONORABLE JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Fmlayson? 
5 MR. FINLAYSON: Good morning Your Honor. We have a 
6 co-defendant. Mr. Anderson and I have a co-defendant case 
1 that's resolved. We can handle that. It's No. 9, Rebecca 
8 Champneys. 
9 THE COURT: Oh, yes and I believe Mr. Anderson has 
10 Ms. Corwell? 
11 MR. FINLAYSON: Right. 
12 MR. ANDERSON: Yes. Ms. Corwell is standing beside 
13 me. 
14 THE COURT: And I assume Ms. Champneys is here. He 
15 she is. 
16 MR. FINLAYSON: She is, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. 
18 MR. FINLAYSON: Your Honor, there is two files for 
19 Champneys. 
20 MR. ANDERSON: If I may approach Your Honor? 
21 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). Oh, yes, I was 
22 about to ask for that. All right. The matters before me are 
23 State of Utah vs. Rebecca Champneys Case #011905093 and State 
24 of Utah vs. Lisa Corwell, #011905094. These matters were 
25 consolidated and set for trial on Monday next and it looks li 
1 both the defendants are present and so where are we today? 
2 MR. FINLAYSON: Your Honor, let me ask you, sometimes 
3 the wheels move faster than you think they are going to but I 
4 got a call from West Valley that they were going to send a case 
5 over on Rebecca from West Valley and I think Evelyn called. 
6 COURT CLERK: Murray. 
7 MR. FINLAYSON: Was it Murray? 
8 THE COURT: I got something from Murray. 
9 MR. FINLAYSON: I guess because they found out we 
10 were going to resolve these, they sent it over and we have a 
11 resolution on that case is you'd like to do it today as well? 
12 THE COURT: They just thought I needed a little more 
13 work? Now, if I sent one to Murray there would be hell to pay. 
14 I'll take the case as long as there's a resolution. 
15 MR. FINLAYSON: My understanding, Your Honor, is that 
16 both Ms. Champneys and Ms. Corwell are going to plead guilty to 
17 a third degree attempt at tampering with evidence and we have, 
18 it would be a plea under State vs. Sery, reserving their right 
19 to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. 
20 MR. LEMCKE: That is the State's understanding, Your 
21 Honor. 
22 MR. FINLAYSON: And then for Ms. Champneys she's also 
23 going to plead guilty to a an attempt on Count 1 of the case 
24 ending in #0772 to a Class A. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. Let me see if I have this right. 
2 
1 Ms. Champneys is pleading guilty to attempted forgery m Case 
2 #8743, right? 
3 MR. FINLAYSON: They give it a different case number 
4 don't they? It's #8743? 
5 THE COURT: #8743 is the one 1 have that the charge 
6 is forgery. That's the one from Murray I guess. Then I have 
7 tampering with evidence. 
8 MR. FINLAYSON: Right. 
9 MR. ANDERSON: It would be an attempted tampering. 
10 THE COURT: Pardon me? 
11 MR. ANDERSON: Attempted tampering with evidence 
12 would make it a third degree felony. 
13 THE COURT: Well, let's take the ones I've got then. 
14 Ms. Champneys is going to plead to attempted tampering with 
15 evidence, a third degree felony and apparently Ms. Corweil is 
16 going to do the same in her case? 
17 MR. ANDERSON: That's correct, Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: And then Count 2 and 3, what happens to 
19 those as far as Ms. Champneys is concerned in Case #5093? 
20 MR. FINLAYSON: Dismissed, Your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: Then the Murray case that I've inherited 
22 here. She's going to plead to attempted forgery, a Class A 
23 Misdemeanor? 
24 MR. FINLAYSON: That's right, Your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Court 2 dismissed? 
3 
1 MR. FINLAYSON: Right. 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Corwell is going to plead to 
3 attempted tampering, a third, Mr. Anderson, is that right? 
4 MR. ANDERSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: And Counts 2 and 3 dismissed? 
6 MR. ANDERSON: That's correct. And again Your Honor 
7 the State agreed (inaudible) State vs. Sery. 
8 THE COURT: Which, so everybody is clear on that, 
9 means you can appeal it. 
10 MR. ANDERSON: That's correct. 
11 THE COURT: I don't have any objection to that. I 
12 always encourage appellate review on any decisions I may make. 
13 Okay. Statements have been prepared for both these ladies? 
14 MR. ANDERSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
15 MR. FINLAYSON: Yes. 
16 THE COURT: And have you both reviewed them with yojr 
17 respective clients? 
18 MR. FINLAYSON: I have, Your Honor. 
19 MR. ANDERSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: Do you believe they understand them? 
21 MR. ANDERSON: Yes. 
22 THE COURT: Ms. Champneys, let me ask you a couple of 
23 questions and then I'm going to ask you and Ms. Corwell some 
24 questions together but as far as you're concerned, Ms. 
25 Champneys, you have read through the document that Mr. 
4 
1 Finlayson has there for your signature ultimately here toda>° 
2 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: Yes, I have. 
3 THE COURT: And did you have plenty of time to 
4 discuss the matters contained in that document with hm? 
5 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: I did. 
6 THE COURT: The reason I ask that is, I don't anybody 
7 to be rushed because the decisions we're making here today are 
8 important decisions as far as you're concerned and I don't want 
9 you giving up any rights that you may have without the full 
10 opportunity to consider those. Do you believe you've done 
11 that? 
12 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: I believe I have, yes. 
13 THE COURT: Ms. Corwell, same question. Have you 
14 reviewed the statement that Mr. Anderson has there for you9 
15 Have you had plenty of time to do that? 
16 DEFENDANT CORWELL: Yes. 
17 THE COURT: Do you believe you understand it? 
18 DEFENDANT CORWELL: Yes. 
19 THE COURT: Do you also understand the importance of 
20 the rights that you give up by pleading guilty that are 
21 contained in that document? 
22 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (inaudible). 
23 THE COURT: You both understand that when a person 
24 pleads guilty to a Third Degree Felony that the potential 
25 maximum sentence is a term in the Utah State Prison that can oe 
5 
1 as long as five years and a fine that can be as high as $5,033. 
2 You both understand that? 
3 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (inaudible). 
4 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (inaudible). 
5 THE COURT: Answer out loud please. 
6 MR. ANDERSON: Answer out loud. 
7 THE COURT: Ms. Champneys as far as you're concerned, 
8 there's a Class A Misdemeanor in this Murray case, attempted 
9 forgery, a Class A Misdemeanor carries a potential of a year in 
10 the county jail and a fine as high as $2,500. Do you 
11 understand that's a possibility on the Class A Misdemeanor? 
12 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: I do. 
13 THE COURT: Does the statement cover both of these 
14 cases on the same document? 
15 MR. FINLAYSON: It does, Your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Champneys, you understand 
17 that if I thought it was necessary to incarcerate you on both 
18 these cases, at the State Prison, I could make the sentences 
19 run consecutively. In other words, when you finished one, the 
20 other would start. Do you understand that's always a 
21 possibility? 
22 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative) 
23 THE COURT: Now, what's going to happen in sentencing 
24 I don't know. I haven't made up my mind on this. I haven't 
25 even given it any thought at all, I don't know (inaudible) and 
6 
1 I won't make up my mind until I'm here on the sentencing day 
2 and I've read the pre-sentence reports and I have the benefit 
3 of what the two of you say and what your attorneys have to say 
4 and what the State's attorney has to say. That's when I'll be 
5 making that decision. Both of you understand that? 
6 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
7 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
8 THE COURT: Now, if you give up your right to have a 
9 trial which is scheduled next Monday, do you both understand 
10 that you give up an important and significant constitutional 
11 and statutory rights as outlined in the paper you both read? 
12 Do you both understand that? 
13 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
14 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
15 THE COURT: I want you also to understand that some 
16 of those rights I want to talK with you about today, just to 
17 make sure that I'm satisfied you're clear. If you plead 
18 guilty, there's no trial next Monday. Do you understand that? 
19 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
20 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
21 THE COURT: Do you want to give up your right to 
22 have a trial next Monday? 
23 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
24 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
25 THE COURT: If there's no trial then you don't get to 
7 
1 testify because there won't be anybody to testify to. if *e 
2 did try this case, both of you, if you chose, wouldn't have to, 
3 but if you chose, could testify and tell the jury what occjrred 
4 or did not occur in connection with these cases. Do you botr 
5 understand you're giving up that right? 
6 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
7 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
8 THE COURT: Also, I want you to understand that if 
9 you plead guilty, you are giving up you right to confront your 
10 accusers and what that means is the people that would be called 
11 by the State in an attempt to convince a ]ury that you 
12 committed this crime you're charged with. Your attorney won't 
13 have the right to cross examine them and test their credibility 
14 and point out any inconsistencies in their testimony and you 
15 won't get to see them here in the courtroom. Do you both 
16 understand you're giving up that right? 
17 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
18 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
19 THE COURT: Both of you at this point in time, are 
20 presumed innocent. As far as I'm concerned, you did not commit 
21 these crimes and that won't change until you tell different if 
22 you do here today. But if we tried this case, I would require 
23 the jury to think the same way. In other words, they could rot 
24 sit on the ]ury unless they agreed that they would start the 
25 case on Monday with the two of you presuming that you were both 
8 
1 innocent and I would tell them that that presumption would have 
2 to follow this case unless and until, if the State could, prove 
3 you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. But otherwise, the 
4 presumption of innocense stays with you. The State doesn't pat 
5 on any evidence, the verdict is not guilty because the 
6 presumption of innocense assumes and presumes that you are not 
7 guilty. That all goes away if you say guilty here today. Do 
8 you both understand that? 
9 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
10 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
11 THE COURT: Do you both want to give up your right to 
12 the presumption of innocense? Both want to give that right up? 
13 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
14 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
15 THE COURT: Okay. You recall that I mentioned the 
16 State has to prove you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
17 That's a very high standard of proof and the burden of proof is 
18 always on the State. Neither one of you has any obligation to 
19 prove that you did not commit this crime. You can put on 
20 evidence if you wanted to but you're not required to. The 
21 burden of proof always stays with the State and if the State 
22 could not convince every member of the jury that you committed 
23 these crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, a high standard of 
24 proof, then the jury finds you not guilty. Do you both 
25 understand you're giving up that opportunity? 
9 
1 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
2 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
3 THE COURT: Now, you both pleaded guilty on your 
4 respective cases to attempted tampering with evidence. The 
5 State claims that these third degree felonies were committed at 
6 1990 West North Temple here in Salt Lake County on March 13cn 
7 of this year and there the State claims that each one of you, 
8 believing that there was an official proceeding or an 
9 investigation going on, that you either altered, destroyed, or 
10 attempted to alter, destroy, or conceal evidence in connection 
11 with that investigation. Is that true? 
12 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
13 DEFENDANT CORWELL: Yes, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: What's the factual statement here? 
15 MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, on March 13 at 1990 West 
16 North Temple, after seeing police officers and having verbal 
17 communications with a police officer at a hotel room 
18 (inaudible) did attempt to conceal materials (inaudible) . 
19 THE COURT: Is that correct as far as a factual 
20 statement is concerned, Ms. Corwell: 
21 MS. CORWELL: Yes. 
22 THE COURT: Same thing for Ms. Champneys? 
23 MR. ANDERSON: Yes, Your Honor, Ms. Champneys was 
24 with Ms. Corwell. 
25 THE COURT: Are those the facts here, Ms. Champneys? 
10 
1 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
2 THE COURT: So, I'm entering your guilty pleas here 
3 today. Ladies, you believe you're guilty of what you're 
4 pleading guilty to? 
5 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
6 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
7 THE COURT: Have either one of you consumed an 
8 alcoholic beverages in the last 24 hours? 
9 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Shakes head in the negative). 
10 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Shakes head in the negative). 
11 THE COURT: Have either one of you taken any drugs of 
12 any kind, prescription or otherwise? 
13 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: I have, prescription. 
14 THE COURT: What kind of prescription, Ms. Champneys? 
15 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: I take (inaudible). 
16 THE COURT: And does that effect your ability to 
17 think clearly? 
18 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: No. 
19 THE COURT: So do you believe you're thinking clearly 
20 right now? 
21 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: Yes. 
22 THE COURT: Ms. Corwell, any drugs of any kind? 
23 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Shakes head in the negative). 
24 THE COURT: Do you believe you're thinking clearly? 
25 DEFENDANT CORWELL: Yes. 
11 
1 THE COURT: Is there anything I've said about the 
2 rights that you're giving up or what we discussed about tms 
3 plea arrangement that is unclear to either one of you? 
4 Anything unclear? 
5 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
6 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
7 THE COURT: Any questions you want to ask me before 
8 you offer a guilty plea? 
9 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
10 DEFENDANT CORWELL: (Nods head in the affirmative). 
11 THE COURT: Counsel, anything else either one of you 
12 would have me ask your client regarding Rule 11 appointments? 
13 MR. ANDERSON: I have nothing, Your Honor. 
14 MR. FINLAYSON: No Your Honor, we do have the Class 
15 on Ms. Champneys too. 
16 THE COURT: Oh yeah. 
17 MR. ANDERSON: I can provide a factual basis for 
18 that. On July 18ch at 2120 South State, Ms. Champneys 
19 attempted to utter writing a check, pass a check purporting to 
20 be acting with another to do fraud and that she had reason to 
21 believe the check was a bad check. 
22 THE COURT: Is that correct, Ms. Champneys? 
23 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: Yes. 
24 THE COURT: That's what happened on July 18th, you 
25 tried to pass a bad check? 
1 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: You knew it was not a good check? 
3 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: Yes, 
4 THE COURT: So do you believe you're guilty of that 
5 Class A Misdemeanor? 
6 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: Yes, I do. 
7 THE COURT: Mr. Lemcke, anything else on the Rule A 
8 requirements? 
9 MR. LEMCKE: No, Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: You may sign the statement, ladies, if 
11 you choose to at this point in time. 
12 MR. FINLAYSON: The (inaudible) have been signed, 
13 Your Honor. 
14 MR. ANDERSON: May we approach, Your Honor? 
15 THE COURT: Please. 
16 All right. Ms. Champneys, for the record then to the 
17 attempted tampering of evidence, a third degree felony charge, 
18 claimed to have occurred at 1990 West North Temple here in Salt 
19 Lake County on March 13th, 2001, is charged in the case ending 
20 5093, how do you plead? 
21 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: Guilty. 
22 THE COURT: Turning to the second case 0011918743, 
23 the one that came in from Murray, you are charged with 
24 attempted forgery, a Class A Misdemeanor, claimed to have 
25 occurred at 2120 South State Street here in Salt Lake County on 
13 
1 July 18:n of 2001, how do you plead? 
2 DEFENDANT CHAMPNEYS: Guilty. 
3 THE COURT: The record will show that I reviewed the 
4 statement and along with the discussions I've had with Ms. 
5 Champneys, I believe that her pleas are properly given and 
6 knowingly given. I think she understands her rights that she 
7 gives up and also the potential consequences and therefore I've 
8 signed the statement and I accept the two pleas. 
9 I assume the State's motions then to dismiss Count 2 
10 and 3 in 5093? 
11 MR. LEMCKE: The State does, Your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: And Count 2 in 8743? 
13 MR. LEMCKE: The State does, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Now, Ms. Corwell, you're charged now with 
15 attempted tampering with evidence, a third degree felony, 
16 claimed to have occurred at 1990 West North Temple here in Salt 
17 Lake County on March 13th of 2001. On that charge, how do you 
18 plead? 
19 MS. CORWELL: Guilty. 
20 THE COURT: Guilty? The State's motion to dismiss 
21 Counts 2 and 3? 
22 MR. LEMCKE: It is, Your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: So ordered. I've signed the statement 
24 that Ms. Corwell has executed . I believe there's a factual 
25 basis for the guilty plea and I also believe that she 
14 
1 understands the rights that she gives up and the potential 
2 consequences and has voluntarily entered her plea. 
3 Okay. Ms. Champneys and Ms. Corwell, having pled 
4 guilty to a third degree felony and a Class A Misdemeanc and a 
5 third degree felony, I advise you that you have the right :o be 
6 sentenced not earlier than two nor more than 45 days from 
7 today's date. 
8 I assume you want pre-sentence reports on both these 
9 ladies? 
10 MR. ANDERSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
11 MR. FINLAYSON: Yes. 
12 THE COURT: February 1st? 
13 MR. ANDERSON: That's fine, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Mr. Finlayson? 
15 MR. FINLAYSON: That's fine, Judge. 
16 THE COURT: I'll set the, I'll refer these matter to 
17 the Adult Probation and Parole for preparation of a pre-
18 sentence report. Sentencing set for September 1st at 9:00. 
19 Ms. Champneys and Ms. Corwell, I'm going to give you 
20 a referral to Adult Probation and Parole. The first order of 
21 business is to be in contact with them. Do not delay. Because 
22 of the holiday period coming up, the time frame for getting 
23 pre-sentence reports done is lessened. People are in the 
24 office less than they usually are. Do not fail to contact 
25 them. Do not fail to follow through on the pre-sentence 
15 
1 report. If that occurs and you get here on February Is" and I 
2 don't have a pre-sentence report because you haven't made any 
3 effort to do it then I sentence you without it and you don't 
4 want me to do that. You've seen what happens today. So, make 
5 this a priority to get the pre-sentence report done. It will 
6 be to your advantage. While I recognize there's an objection 
7 to the Court's finding as you've both signed off on the form on 
8 the findings of facts and conclusion? 
9 MR. ANDERSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
10 MR. FINLAYSON: Yes, Judge. 
11 THE COURT: I will sign those now including the order 
12 in both cases and I will see you all on the 1st of February. 
13 MR. FINLAYSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
14 MR. ANDERSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
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CASE NO. <7itfCjrC<!f 
CCMES NOW. L,2* (Jfc/irCl the defendant in 
case and hereby acJcnowledges and cert i f ies the foHewing: 
I am entering a plea of guilty to the following crime (s; 
A. 
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I have received a copy of the Information against a*, : have 
read it, and I understand the nature and elements cf the offense s 
for which I am pleading guilty. 
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as 
f
 Q11 nw« : Via f *n* „r * £ > < > A/jr, A fS. *V>( * £ Iff6 //>,>J / '• ,r \ 
«y'conduct, 'and the ccpfduct of othe-c persons for whirr. I ar. 
criminally l iable/ that constitutes the elements of the crime(s; 
charged i s as follows:. 
/ryLr <mr>n~ f^-*' <*(<>*J* ^J Jfr AA<( f<x<r*\ sfa.-
t2± /^^(yr^-
I am entering this/these pleats) voluntarily and with 
knowledge and understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented fey an 
attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will ce 
appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I recognize chat a 
condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as 
determined by the Court, to recoup the cost of counsel if s: 
appointed for me. 
S~l 
-3-
2. I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. I: : have 
waived my right to counsel, I have done so knowingly, inteiiiger.-ly 
and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
3. If r have waived my right to counsel, I have real this 
statement and understand the nature and elements of the charges, r.y 
rights in this case and other proceedings and the consequences c: 
my plea of guilty. 
fl, 4. If I h*ve-not waived my right to counsel, my attorney 15 
ftyf^Srfc L /+Af£i{/&r~\ , and I have had an opportunity to fully 
discuss this statement, my rights and the consequences of my guil-y 
plea with ay attorney. 
5. I know that I have a right to a trial in open court by an 
impartial jury, and that I am giving up that right by pleading 
guilty. 
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right t: 
confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have the.-, 
cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have the righ-
to compel my witness(s) by subpoena at State expense to testify m 
court in my behalf. I understand that I am giving up these rights 
if I plead guilty. 
7. 1 know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf 
but if I choose not to do so I cannot be compelled to testify c: 
give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will be 
drawn against me if I do not testify. I understand that I ar. 
giving up these rights if I plead guilty. 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me I 
need only plead "not guilty" and the matter will be set for trial. 
At the trial the State of Utah will have the burden of proving each 
element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is 
before a jury the verdict must be unanimous. 
-4-
9- I understand the fact that as a defendant I enjoy the 
right of a presumption of innocence. I understand that : am 
presumed innocent until the State proves my guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt if this case is tried to a jury, or until I plead 
guilty. I understand that I give up the right to the presume tier. 
of innocence if I plead guilty. 
10. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I were 
tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I would have tne 
right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of 
Appeals .or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court, and that if : 
could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs 
would be paid by the State. I understand that I am giving u? these 
rights if I plead guilty. 
11. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
offense to which I plead guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to 
an offense that carries a minimum mandatory senter.ee that I will be 
subjecting myself to serving a minimum mandatory senzer.ee for that 
offense. I know that the sentence may be consecutive and may be 
for a prison term, fine or both. I know that in addition to a 
fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. I 
also know that I may be ordered by the Court to make restitution to 
any victim(s) of my crimes, including any restitution that may be 
owed on charges that are dismissed, if any, as a result of this 
plea agreement. 
12. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, 
or the fine for an additional amount, if my plea is to more than 
one charge. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or 
awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have beer, 
convicted or to which I have pled guilty, my plea in the present 
action may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
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13- I know and understand that by pleading guilty, : am 
waiving and giving up my statutory and constitutional rights se: 
out in the preceding paragraphs, r also know chat by entering such 
plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the 
conduct alleged and I am guilty off the crime (s) for which my 
piea(s) is/are entered. 
14. My plea(s) off guilty (is)(is not) the result of a plea 
bargain between myselff and the prosecuting attorney. The premises, 
duties and provisions off this plea bargain, iff any, are fully 
contained in this statement. 
15. I know and understand that iff I desire to withdraw my 
piea(s) off guilty and there is a legal basis to do so, I mus- file 
a motion within thirty (30) days afft er enVr1/ ef IAL1J {sie^ t* 
16. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation off probation or suspended sentence, including a 
reduction off the charges ffor sentencing made or sought by either 
defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding en the 
Judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what 
they believe the Court may do are also not binding on the Court. 
17. No threats, coercion/ or unlawful influence of any kind 
have been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no promises except 
those contained in this statement, have been made to me. 
18. I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me 
by my attorney, and I understand its provisions. I know that I am 
free to change or delete anything contained in this statement. I 
do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are 
correct. 
19. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my 
attorney. 
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2Q. I am 3>3> years of age; I have attended school thrcugn 
the /(/? grade and I can read and understand the English language, 
or an interpreter has been provided to me. I was not under tne 
influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants which wculd 
impair ay judgment when the decision was made to enter the piea(s) . 
I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication cr 
intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
21. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, 
mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea, and free of any mental disease, defect :: 
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently anc 
voluntarily entering my pieav 
Dated thi< 
l a.
: iis_2_day at De, *~Ler 
DE 
J 
CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney fcr L )?a (jC^1^ ' ' 
the defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement 
or that I have read it to him/her and I have discussed it with 
him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning cf 
its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best 
of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the 
elements of the crime (s) and the factual synopsis of the 
defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, along 
with the other representations and declarations made by the 
defendant in the foregoing affidavit/ are accurate and true. 
tffORNEY FCR DEFENDANT /EAR # 
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CSRTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the 
case against f\£* 'nALutCl
 t defendant. I have 
reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual 
basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the 
offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats 
or coercion to encourage a plea have been offered defendant. The 
plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the 
attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the 
Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence 
would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for 
which the plea(s) is/are entered and the acceptance of the pleats) 
would serve the public interest. 
ORDER 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and 
the certification of the defendant and counsel, the Court witnesses 
the signatures and finds the defendant's pleats) of guilty is 
freely and voluntarily made and it is so ordered that the 
defendant's pleats) of guilty to the char^e(s) set forth in the 
Statement be accepted and entei 
Dated tehla 7 d*v of A&&nO<f—. 1999. 
ISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
v^ 
